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Abstract— Blind signatures enable users to obtain valid signatures
for a message without revealing its content to the signer. This paper
presents a new blind signature scheme, i.e. identity-based blind sig-
nature scheme with message recovery. Due to the message recovery
property, the new scheme requires less bandwidth than the identity-
based blind signatures with similar constructions. The scheme is
based on modified Weil/Tate pairings over elliptic curves, and thus
requires smaller key sizes for the same level of security compared
to previous approaches not utilizing bilinear pairings. Security and
efficiency analysis for the scheme is provided in this paper.
Keywords— Blind Signature, Message Recovery, Pairings, Elliptic
Curves, Blindness.
I. INTRODUCTION
ITH the development of electronic commerce, the pre-W servation of the anonymity of users has been an imper-
ative need. Blind signatures are one of the cryptographic tools
which can provide such anonymity for users. Therefore, they
are one important tool for electronic cash transmission since
the way to ensure anonymity goes through the use of e-cash
[9], [23]. A blind signature scheme is an interactive protocol
which involves two entities, a Bank and a user. It enables a
user to obtain a valid signature for a message m from a Bank
without her seeing the message. If the Bank sees m and its
signature at a later time, she can verify that the signature is
genuine but she is unable to link the message-signature pair
to a particular instance of the signing protocol which has led
to this pair.
The concept of blind signatures was first proposed by
Chaum [9] in 1982. It allows to secure electronic payment
systems that protect a customer’s privacy or anonymity. There-
fore, blind signatures can be applied to secure e-coins and
secure e-votings. Thereafter, some blind signature schemes
were proposed [1], [4], [24].
Nyberg and Rueppel [22] introduced the general signatures
with message recovery which has been adopted in the recent
IEEE standards [17]. Just as what Nyberg and Rueppel re-
ported, based on the same principles as DSA, a signature
scheme can be constructed which achieves message recovery,
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but cannot be used as the RSA signature scheme for encryption
by inter-changing the roles of the private and public transfor-
mations. The advantages are obvious: applications without a
hash function are possible, smaller bandwidth for signatures
of small messages, and direct use in other schemes such as
identity-based public key systems or key agreement protocols.
Thanks to their motivations, it is interesting to construct an
identity-based blind signature scheme with message recovery.
The bilinear pairings [6], especially modified Weil/Tate
pairings have been a useful tool for cryptographic protocols
since Joux’s work [18]. Due to the desirable use of the
bilinear pairings in public key cryptography, identity based
cryptography has been re-investigated since Shamir proposed
the first identity-based cryptosystem [25]. Recently, some
identity-based schemes based on pairings have been proposed.
Interesting examples include Boneh and Franklin’s id-based
encryption from the Weil pairing [6], Hess’s id-based signa-
tures based on pairings [16], Han et al’s committal deniable
signatures [14] and undeniable signatures [15], Libert and
Quisquater’s undeniable signatures based on pairings [21],
and Verhel’s self-blindable credential certificates from pairings
[27].
However, no blind signatures with message recovery based
on pairings over elliptic curves has been proposed so far. The
advantage of the blind signature schemes with message recov-
ery is obvious in communication which requires the smaller
bandwidth for signed messages, when compared with the same
constructions except the message recovery. Therefore, it is
interesting to construct a blind signature scheme with message
recovery based on pairings over elliptic curves. This paper
presents a new blind signature which has message recovery
and is based on pairings over elliptic curves. As there have
been many cryptographic designs that combine the bilinear
pairings, we wish to fill the gap between the general blind
signatures and the blind signatures with message recovery by
utilizing bilinear pairings.
This paper proposes an id-based blind signature scheme
with message recovery. The proposed scheme is motivated
by the work of [3], [27]. From the perspective of both blind
signatures and id-based cryptosystems from the Gap-Diffie-
Hellman groups, the new scheme is comparable with [4].
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows:
In the next section, some computational preliminaries are
presented. Section 3 provides the definition of blind signatures
and id-based blind signatures with message recovery. Section
4 presents the description of the proposed scheme. Analysis of
the scheme is presented in section 5. Comparison with other
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blind signature schemes is presented in section 6. The last
section concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Pairings over Elliptic Curves
Let p be a sufficiently large prime that satisfies: (1) p ≡
2mod3; (2) p = 6q−1, where q is also a large prime. Consider
respectively the elliptic curves E/Fp and E/Fp2 defined by
the equation.
y2 = x3 + 1. (1)
Let G1 be an additive group of points of prime order q on
an elliptic curve E/Fp and let G2 be a multiplicative group
of same order q of the finite field Fp2 . Roughly speaking, an
elliptic curve is a set of all points Q whose abscissa value and
vertical value satisfy Equation (1).
The modified Weil pairing is a bilinear mapping from G1×
G1 to G2,
e : G1 × G1 → G2
satisfying that the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (ECDL)
problems are difficult in G1 and the Inversion of Weil pairing
(IWP) problems are difficult in G2. All these requirements
are needed in our new scheme and will be stated in the next
section.
The modified Weil pairing e : G1 × G1 → G2 has the
following properties:
(1) Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab for every pair
P, Q ∈ G1 and for any a, b ∈ Zp.
(2) Non-degeneracy: there exists at least one point P ∈ G1
such that e(P, P ) = 1.
(3) Efficient Computability: there are efficient algorithms to
compute the bilinear pairing e.
B. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms
(Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem) Given P
as a generator of G1, and given xP , where x is an unknown
random element of Z∗q , the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm
(ECDL) problem is to find x.
(ECDLP Assumption) ECDLP Assumption implies there
is no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm to solve the El-
liptic Curve Discrete Logarithm problem with non-negligible
advantage.
C. Inversion of Modified Weil Pairings
(Inversion of Modified Weil Pairings Problem) Given G1,
G2 and e(·, ·) as above, choose P a generator of G1, given
e(P, ∗), here ∗ is an unknown point of G1, the Inversion of
Modified Weil Pairings (IWP) problem is to find Q ∈ G1 such
that
e(P, Q) = e(P, ∗).
IWP Assumption implies that The IWP Assumption is
that there is no probabilistic polynomial algorithm to solve
the Inversion of Modified Weil Pairings problem with non-
negligible advantage.
III. MODEL OF BLIND SIGNATURES
The concept of blind signatures was first proposed by
Chaum [9] in 1982 in order to deal with the following problem:
A user Alice wants to obtain a digital signature on a message
chosen by herself from the notary Bob, but Bob should not
have any idea which message he signs. If he gets the message
and the signature later, it must not be possible that Bob
can find a relationship between some blinded and unblinded
parameters.
The formal definition of a blind signature scheme is pre-
sented below [9], [19].
Blind Signatures A blind signature scheme consists of three
algorithms and two parties (the user and the signer). The
details are as follows:
(1) (System Key Generation) This is a probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithm (PPT algorithm). It takes a security
parameter k as its input and outputs a pair of public key and
private key {y, x} for the blind signature scheme, where x is
preserved secretly by the signer.
(2) (Generation of Blind Signatures) This is an interactive
and probabilistic polynomial time protocol, which is operated
by the user and the signer. The user first blinds the message
m and obtains a new version m′ of m, and then sends it to
the signer. The latter utilizes her private key to sign on m′
and obtains s′, and then sends it to the sender. The sender
unblinds it to obtain s which is a blind signature on m.
(3) (Verification of Blind Signatures) This is a determin-
istic polynomial time algorithm. Given a message m and
its alleged blind signature s, anyone who knows the public
key y can verify the validity of s. If it is valid, then the
algorithm outputs ’1’; otherwise outputs ’0’: V eri(y, m, s) ≡
{ 1 , if s is a valid blind signature of m;
0, if s is not a valid blind signature of m.
Blindness We say a blind signature is of blindness if
the signer’s view (m′, s′) and the signature-message pair
(m, s) are statistically independent. In some papers [9], [23],
blindness is also called unlinkability.
A secure blind signature scheme must satisfy the following
three requirements:
(1) Correctness: If the user and the signer both comply with
the algorithm of blind signature generation, then the blind
signature s will be always accepted, i.e.
V eri(y, m, s) ≡ 1.
(2) Unforgeability of Valid Blind Signatures: it is with
respect to the user especially, i.e. the user is not able to
forge blind signatures which are accepted by the algorithm
of Verification of Blind Signatures.
(3) Blindness: While correctly operating one instance of the
blind signature scheme, let the output be (m, s)(i.e. message-
signature pair),, and the view of the protocol be ṽ. At a later
time, the signer is not able to link ṽ to (m, s).
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IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present the proposed blind signature
scheme with message recovery.
A. System Initialization
In this blind signature scheme, there is a trusted system
authority SA which is responsible for the generation of the
system parameters. The detailed steps are as follows:
(1) Let p be a sufficient large prime satisfying that: (1)p ≡
2mod3; (2)p = 6q − 1, where q is also a prime. Consider the
equation
y2 = x3 + 1 (2)
which defines elliptic curves E/Fp and E/Fp2 . G1 is an
additive group of order q of E/Fp, and G2 a multiplicative
group of q of F ∗p2 . (2) SA chooses a cryptographic hash
function as in [7]
H : {0, 1}∗ → G1.
(3) SA chooses a bilinear pairing, i.e. modified Weil or Tate
pairing e(·, ·) described as [8]. where:
e : G1 × G1 → G2.
(4) Choose a generator P of G1 and a random number
a ∈ Z∗q . SA holds a secretly and publishes Ppub = aP .
(5) Let f ∈ {0, 1}∗ represent an identifier of the signer, for
instance, this identifier may be her email address or library
card number, which is the public key in the identity-based
blind signatures. In fact, in signing algorithm, Qf = H(f)
which is the corresponding part of public key f will be viewed
as the public key of signers. SA computes SK = aQf and
sends it (as a private key) to the signer. In order to avoid
SA’s full control on the secret parameters, we can use some
threshold secret sharing scheme to participate the SA.
(6) Let the message space be M = Z∗q .
Therefore, the system public parameters are:
PK = {P, Ppub, Qf , e(·, ·),H}
and the signer’s private key is SK = aQf .
B. Generation of Blind Signatures
This is an interactive probabilistic polynomial time algo-
rithm. The user (Alice) and the signer (Bob) operate this
algorithm interactively. Now Alice holds a message m ∈ Z∗q
secretly. m may contain something important. Alice does not
want Bob to know it; On the other hand, she needs the
signature on m from Bob. So they do as follows:
(1) The signer Bob chooses x ∈ Z∗q randomly and uni-
formly, and computes A = xP . Then Bob sends A to Alice.
(2) The user Alice first chooses α and β randomly and
uniformly from Zq. Then she computes the following two
elements:
B = e(αP + βQf , Ppub) · m · e(A + P, Ppub);
and
m̃ = (B + β)mod q.
Afterwards, she sends m̃ to the signer Bob.
(3) After receiving m̃, the signer Bob computes
S̃ = xPpub + m̃SK.
Then he sends this value to Alice.
(4) After receiving S̃, Alice will compute E = S̃ + αPpub.
(5) At the end of the generation of blind signatures, Bob
will output
< m̃,A, S̃ >
as the protocol view in this protocol. Alice will output
< m, (B,E) >
as the blind signature, i.e. (B,E) is the blind signature of
message m.
C. Message-Recovery and Signature-Verification
This is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm operated
only by the user Alice. Alice will first recover an alleged
message m0; then she will compare it with her original
message m. If they are equal, she will accept the blind
signature as valid; otherwise, rejects it. The algorithm is as
follows: Given a message m and its corresponding alleged
blind signature B,E:
(1) The user Alice first computes F = e(E, P ) ∈ G1.
(2) Alice then computes
m0 =
Be(Qf , Ppub)Bmod q
Fe(P, Ppub)
.
(3) Alice checks whether
m0 =? m(mod q).
If the equality holds, she will accept (B,E) as the valid blind
signature of m; otherwise, she will reject it.
V. SECURITY EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
This section we will provide the security evaluation and
analysis for the proposed blind signature scheme. We will
prove that the blind signature scheme with message recovery
enjoys the following properties:
(1) Correctness; (2) Blindness; (3) Unforgeability. The third
property guarantees that Alice cannot represent Bob to produce
valid blind signatures for new messages. In addition, we will
discuss the replay attack on the proposed scheme.
A. Correctness
Blind signature with message recovery means that any blind
signature produced correctly by the proposed blind signing
algorithm will always be accepted by the corresponding
message-recovery and signature-verification algorithm. That
is, it always holds
V eri(m,PK, (B,E)) ≡ 1 (3)
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if (B,E) is a valid blind signature of m with respect to public
key PK.
Theorem 1 The proposed scheme has correctness.
Proof. In fact, if (B, E) is a blind signature produced
correctly by the blind signing algorithm, then by the message-
recovery and signature-verification algorithm we have:
F = e(E, P )
= e(S̃ + αPpub, P )
= e(xPpub + m̃SK, P )e(αPpub, P )
= e(xPpub, P )e(αPpub, P )e(m̃SK, P )
= e(xP, Ppub)e(Qf , aP )m̃e(αPpub, P )
= e(A,Ppub)e(αP, Ppub)e(Qf , Ppub)(B+β)mod q
Therefore,
e(E, P )−1 · B · e(Qf , Ppub)Bmod q
= e(−A,Ppub)e(−αP, Ppub)e(Qf , Ppub)−βe(αP +
βQf , Ppub) · m · e(A + P, Ppub)
= e(−αP, Ppub)e(Qf , Ppub)−βe(αP + βQf , Ppub) · m ·
e(P, Ppub)
= e(Qf , Ppub)−β · m · e(βQf , Ppub) · e(P, Ppub)











Therefore, the correctness is proved.
B. Blindness
Blindness is one important property of the proposed blind
signature scheme with message recovery. In fact, blindness
means that the signer cannot figure out what’s the value
of the message he signs blindly during the process of the
scheme. Therefore, blindness realizes the anonymity for the
underlying protocol, especially for the user of the protocol. In
the following, we will prove the new scheme has the blindness
(i.e.unlinkability).
Theorem 2 The proposed scheme is of the blindness.
Proof. In order to prove the blindness of the scheme, we
show that given any view V and any valid message-signature
pair (m, (B,E)) with B ∈ G2 and E ∈ G1, there exists a
unique pair of blinding factors α and β. Because the user
chooses the blinding factors α and β at random, the blindness
of the proposed scheme follows.
If the blind signature (B, E) of a message m has been
generated during an instance of the scheme with view V
consisting of m̃, A = xP , x ∈ Z∗q , and S̃ = xPpub + m̃SK,
then the following equation must hold for blinding factors α
and β:
m̃ = (B + β)mod q, (4)
B = e(αP + βQf , Ppub) · m · e(A + P, Ppub), (5)
E = S̃ + αPpub. (6)
Because m̃, α and β are relatively prime to q, the blinding
factors β and α can be uniquely determined by the first and
third equation respectively:
β = (m̃ + ((−B)mod q))(mod q) (7)
α = (logPpub(E + (−S̃)))(mod q) (8)
The above formula of α is the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
of (E + (−S̃)) ∈ G1 with respect to the base Ppub. In fact,
we use αPpub = E + (−S̃) replacing α in the proof.
By substituting S̃ = xPpub + m̃SK, we obtain:
e(Ppub, P )α × e(Qf , Ppub)β × e(xPpub, P )
= e(αPpub, P ) × e(βQf , Ppub) × e(xPpub, P )
= e(E + (−((B + β)SK)), P ) × e(βQf , Ppub)
= (e(E + (−((B)SK)), P ))mod q
Therefore, we have:
B = e(Ppub, P )α × e(Qf , Ppub)β × e(xPpub, P ) × m ×
e(Ppub, P )
= e(E + (−((B)SK)), P ) × m × e(Ppub, P ).




= e(E+(−((B)SK)),P )×m×e(Ppub,P )e(Qf ,Ppub)
Bmod q
e(E,P )
= e(E,P )×m×e(Qf ,Ppub)
Bmod q
e(SK,P )Bmod q×e(E,P )
= m(mod q)
where e(E, P ) = 0(mod p), and e(Ppub, P ) = 0(mod p).
Therefore, there exists a unique pair of blinding factors α
and β for any view V and any valid message-signature pair
(m, (B,E)) with B ∈ G2 and E ∈ G1. Because the user
chooses the blinding factors α and β at random, the blindness
of the proposed scheme follows.
C. Unforgeability
Why do we discuss the unforgeability with respect to the
user? Because the user can obtain more useful information
about the underlying blind signature scheme than any other
adversary party (except SA). So in the following it is assumed
that we can construct an algorithm which will use the user as
a subroutine to attack the proposed scheme. In the end, here
comes a contradiction between the prerequisite of the theorem
and our proof assumption.
Theorem 3 (The Unforgeability) The proposed blind
signature scheme with message recovery has the unforgeability
with respect to the user under the difficulty of the underlying
Inversion of Modified Weil Pairings problems and the Elliptic
Curve Discrete Logarithm problems.
Proof.
Here we will use the reduction to absurdity during the proof.
We first construct a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm
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and use W to denote this algorithm. We then use W to solve
the Inversion of Modified Weil Pairings problem. Therefore,
a contradiction will be concluded.
W is admitted to use the user as a subroutine, as well
as making queries to the message signing simulator(i.e. PPT
algorithm) of the proposed scheme. At the same time, the
following requirements need to be satisfied:
Suppose the user has a random transcript:
LISTSENDER.
On it there store all the data transmitted between the user and
signer during the process of interaction of the blind signature
scheme. All these data include the data the user receives from
the message signing simulator, as well as all the data computed
and randomly chosen by the sender herself.
We also let the message signing simulator have a random
transcript:
LISTSIGNER.
On it there store all the data transmitted between the message
signing simulator and the user during the process of interaction
of the blind signature scheme. All these data include the data
the message signing simulator receives from the user, as well
as all the data computed and secretly chosen by the sender
herself.
For the above two random transcripts, the probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithm W is able to borrow some data from
them. That is to say, W can fully access to LISTSENDER
and obtain the data from it. At the same time, W is able to
only limitedly access to LISTSIGNER and obtain a little data
limitedly but not fully.
In order to complete the proof, we can assume W is able
to forge valid blind signature which can be accepted by the
Message-Recovery and Signature-Verification algorithm of the
scheme. Without loss of generality, we may assume W has
constructed two different valid blind signatures for a message
m:
(B1, E1)and (B2, E2) (9)
Since they are valid blind signatures, it is admitted to assume
E1 = S̃1 + α1Ppub,
E2 = S̃2 + α2Ppub,
S̃1 = m̃1SK + xPpub,
S̃2 = m̃2SK + xPpub,
where x ∈ Zq is a random element which W obtains from the
message signing simulator. And α1 and α2 are two elements
from Z∗q chosen by the user. m̃1 and m̃2 are computed by the
user. All these 4 elements exist in LISTSENDER. Therefore,
W is able to access to them. Thus,
E1 − E2
= (S̃1 − S̃2) + (α1 − α2)Ppub
= (m̃1 − m̃2)SK + (α1 − α2)Ppub.
Therefore,
(m̃1 − m̃2)SK = (E1 − E2) − (α1 − α2)Ppub,
Therefore,
SK = (m̃1 − m̃2)−1((E1 − E2) − (α1 − α2)Ppub).
Consequently, according to (or by) the System Initialization
algorithm of the blind signature scheme, we can solve a
solution X = SK to the following equation:
e(X, P ) = y where X is an unknown element. (10)
where y is the already known value e(Qf , Ppub). It is easy to
see that this contradicts the difficulty of Inversion of Modified
Weil Pairing problems. Therefore, the theorem is concluded.
VI. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
In this section we will analyze the proposed scheme from
the computational and communication point of view.
In the blind signature generation of the new scheme the
signer needs to compute three scalar multiplications in G1,
while the user needs to compute three scalar multiplications
in G1, two pairing evaluation (In fact, the two evaluation
can be computed by one pairing evaluation). In the message-
recovery and verification, the user needs to compute one
pairing evaluation (the other two can be precomputed in case
of packing verifications), one exponentiation in G2.
From the point of communication cost, the new scheme
does not need to transmit the signed message together with its
corresponding blind signatures, while [4] does need.
At the same time, some computational techniques in [8],
[10], [7], [26], [13] can be utilized when the proposed scheme
is implemented for practical uses.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a new blind signature scheme, i.e.
identity-based blind signatures with message recovery. This
new scheme needs smaller bandwidth in contrast to previous
identity-based blind signatures. On the other hand, this new
scheme is based on modified Weil or Tate pairings over elliptic
curves. Therefore, it has smaller key sizes in the same level of
security comparing with previous blind signatures which were
not based on pairings.
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